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I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently removed an arrow
from the quiver used by judges to administer pretrial detention,
namely: cash only bail. The court held, on constitutional
2grounds, trialjudges may no longer set a monetary bail amount for
an accused that can only be met by a cash deposit for the full
amount of the bail. Broadly speaking, the question at issue in-
volved what limits, if any, exist on judicial discretion to command a
t J.D. Candidate, 2003 William Mitchell College of Law; B.S. St. Mary's Uni-
versity.
1. State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345 (Minn. 2000) (en banc).
2. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7. "All persons before conviction shall be bailable
by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the
presumption great." Id.
3. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 354.
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specific form of acceptable bail, where a range of surety options are
available.4 The opinion was narrowly crafted, thus, avoiding many
pretrial detention pitfalls surrounding liberty rights.
In Part II, this Note briefly examines the history of Anglo-
American bail, examines three recent federal decisions surround-
ing the topic, and looks at Minnesota practices in a bail context. In
Part III, the Note reviews the circumstances and decision of the
Brooks court. Part IV analyzes the basis for the court's decision,
identifies alternative issues, and proffers a question on post-
conviction relief. Finally, the Note concludes a continuing Minne-
sota judiciary devotion to the rights of an accused person, concern-
ing both substantive due process and equal protection under the
law.
With the court's holding, Minnesota joins the ranks of a hand-
ful ofjurisdictions explicitly asserting an individual's liberty interest
in bail proceedings,5 thereby expanding federal constitutional safe-
guards.
II. HISTORY
The traditional purpose of bail7 is to ensure, upon release, the
accused's physical presence at a later trial, and submission to the
judgment of the court. A court will weigh the seriousness of the al-
leged crime, together with an assessment of flight risk by the ac-
cused; in the process coming to grips with whether any bail is war-
ranted, and if so, what amount is sufficient to ensure submission.
8
Historically, bail use has ebbed and expanded over time, subject to
the changing needs of the society.
4. Id. at 353.
5. E.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to
Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1998). The bail proceeding
lies in the period between arraignment and trial, and is critical for ensuring that
an accused has an opportunity to prepare a defense, is represented by counsel,
and has the benefit of any protections afforded by due process rights. At the state
level, most states do not guarantee a liberty interest at this stage of the proceeding.
However, some states do make provisions for a right to counsel for indigent de-
fendants, thus following the federal model. Id.
6. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 350.
7. BLACs's LAw DICTIONARY 140 (6th ed. 1990). "To set at liberty a person
arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and a
place certain, which security is called 'bail'...." Id.
8. See generally 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bail & Recognizance § 2, 249-448 (2nd ed.
1997) (referring to Part III, and the particular factors affecting right or granting of
bail or recognizance).
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A. Anglo-American Common Law
The roots of bail lie shrouded in the mists of medieval antiq-
uity.9 It was not until enactment of the Statute of Westminster ' ° in
1275, that rules surrounding bail were codified and a class system
put in place."
English colonists brought with them the underpinnings on
bail, as promulgated by the earlier Statute of Westminster. 2 Colo-
nial America experienced much less crime in everyday life than
England did.'3 Hence, the colonial courts rarely used pretrial de-
tention in administering justice.' 4 In 1641, Massachusetts became
the first colony to depart from the English tradition by recognizing
"all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capi-
tal offenses, where proof is evident, or the presumption great.
''
1
5
Many colonies, and later states, followed this bail model.
The framework of the modern common law surrounding bail,
pretrial detention, and federal constitutional safeguards has its
foundation in three decisive cases from the latter half of the twen-
9. Compare RONALD GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL
SYSTEM 6-14 (1965) (stating that bail was a term analogous with "getting out", and
further, it was derived from the French term baille, meaning "to deliver." In addi-
tion, Goldfarb ties the terminology to that of Sir Edward Coke, in his work, Treatise
of Bail and Mainprize, where Coke says "[b]aily is an old Saxon word [signifying] a
safekeeper or protector [so] when a man upon surety is delivered out of
prison.. .he is delivered into bayle."); with June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor's
New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 517, 519-521 (1983) (stating that the origin of Anglo-Saxon bail was a com-
plement to a money fine, or "bot", which the surety of an accused would pledge,
or "borh," so as to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and payment
of a fine upon conviction).
10. Carbone, supra note 9, at 523. The Statute of Westminster not only codi-
fied existing practices surrounding bail, it also introduced the concept of corporal
punishment for more serious offenses. Id. at 524-25. Five centuries passed before
the next round of substantive change in bail administration. Id. at 523.
11. Id. at 523. Corporal punishment for more serious offenses effectively pro-
vided an entire class of defendants (i.e. those charged with homicide penalized
with death), with the incentive to flee from the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 522.
12. Id. at 529.
13. Id. at 530.
14. Id.
15. Donald B. Verilli, Jr., The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical
Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 337 (1982). As of 1976, forty states had
adopted a constitutional right to bail. Most of these states based the decision
upon the Massachusetts model. Id. at 353. Minnesota is one of these states, how-
ever, the Minnesota bail clause model is generally thought to be modeled after the
Pennsylvania Constitution, enacted subsequent to the Massachusetts offering.
State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 352, 355 n.4 (Minn. 2000).
2000] 1275
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tieth century.
B. Federal Bail Law
1. Stack v. Boyle
The United States Constitution does not contain any explicit
right to bail.16 However, in Stack v. Boyle,I7 the United States Su-
preme Court determined that the Framers intended to protect pre-
trial liberty. 8  Further, the court noted, from colonial times
through the dawn of the twentieth century, federal law has man-
dated admission to bail for all non-capital offenses, classifying bail
as a "right to freedom before conviction."' 9
In Stack, the defendants were accused Communist sympathiz-
ers and conspirators, charged with a violation of the Smith Act2°
during the McCarthy era." Once charged, the court admitted each
of the twelve defendants to bail at $50,000, a significant amount in
221950; none of the accused was able to post a surety. The court
held bail serves a dual purpose. First, bail keeps the accused out of21
jail so they can mount a case unhampered. Second, bail allows
the wrongly accused to avoid any punishment implicit in impris-
24onment while awaiting trial. In addition, every accused person is
deemed to "stand[] before the bar of justice as an individual.'a2
Hence, in a bail decision individual factors relating to each accused
must be considered.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating "excessive bail shall not be required...").
17. 342 U.S. 1,4 (1951).
18. Id. at 4 (holding that excessive bail is prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
ment and implying a right to bail) (emphasis added).
19. Id.; Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895).
20. ALIEN REGISTRATION ACT OF 1940, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940). This legisla-
tion made it a crime to commit an act of conspiracy against, advocate the over-
throw of, or participate in sedition against the United States. Id.
21. Daniel J. Flynn, Rethinking McCarthyism, CAMPUS REPORT (Sept. 1998) at
http://www.academia.org/CampusReport/Septemberl998/mccarthyism.htm.
"McCarthyism" refers to the political period in the United States between 1950
and 1956 when Sen. Joseph McCarthy from Wisconsin engaged in Communist
"witch hunts" within the U.S. government. Id. Today, these acts, and the public
support they engendered, are often cast as a period of demagoguery. Id. Interest-
ingly, Communists within this country were early supporters of the Smith Act, feel-
ing it would aid them in their fight against Trotskyites and German Bundists. Id.
22. Stack, 342 U.S. at 3.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 9.
1276 [Vol. 27:2
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2. United States v. Hazzard
During the latter half of the twentieth century, collateral to the
civil rights movement, and later during the Reagan era, Congress
sought to make fundamental changes to bail administration in
26American courts.
27The Bail Reform Act of 1984, via its pretrial detention
clause,2s resulted in a significant shift away from focus on the ac-
cused's liberty interest. For the first time, the judiciary thrust itself
into a prediction relating to future "dangerousness" of the accused
in the bail decision, thereby, calling into question a fundamental
right-the presumption of innocence. If a judge determined the
likelihood existed for an accused to commit further crimes while
on pretrial release, then preventive detention was warranted.
The Hazzard case ° was one of the first opportunities for appel-3
late review of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Here, the defendant
was on trial for kidnapping and rape. Subsequent to defendant's
arrest a federal magistrate, employing the recently codified provi-
sions of the Bail Reform Act,13 denied bail because he felt no com-
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (1966). The Bail Reform Act of 1966 codified a
presumption in favor of pretrial release, laid out non-monetary forms of release,
and added community ties as a consideration for release. In practice, the concept
of community ties as a condition of release element never seemed to work. The
apparent virtue of this approach is that it relies completely on flight risk, as op-
posed to, seriousness of offense in the consideration. The principal purpose of
this legislation was to ensure that those persons economically, or socially disadvan-
taged are able to obtain some measure of relief if unable to achieve release on
their own recognizance. Carbone, supra note 9, at 554.
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1984).
28. Id. § 3142.
29. Donald P. Lay & Jill De La Hunt, The Bail Reform Act of 1984: A Discussion,
11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 929, 935-41 (1985). The Act makes a connection be-
tween crime generally, and pretrial release, not existing in earlier legislation. Id.
The resulting inference forms the basis for the detention decision, even though,
the statute calls elsewhere for the least restrictive set of bail conditions. Id.
30. United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. I11. 1984).
31. Id. at 1455.
32. Id. at 1446.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3141-3150. The factors ajudicial officer must assess include:
1) nature and circumstance of the offense charged; 2) weight of the evidence
against the accused; 3) history and characteristics of the person, including their: a)
the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment,
financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past
conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record
concerning appearance at court proceedings; and b) whether the accused is on
probation, parole, or release pending other trial, sentencing, or appeal. Id. §
3142.
2000] 1277
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bination of conditions of pretrial release would reasonably assure
the safety of the community.1
4
The defense contended both facial and as applied constitu-
tional rights deprivations of equal protection of the law and due
process." In framing its holding, the Illinois court developed a two-
36part test. First, does preventative detention under a statute serve a
legitimate governmental objective? Second, are the procedural
safeguards within the statute sufficient to ensure that at least some
defendants are not subject to pretrial detention? Presumably, if
both questions are answered affirmatively, due process and equal
protection concerns are satisfied.37
However, the real significance of Hazzard is simple. It provides
judicial endorsement of community safety interest in the federal
bail decision.
3. United States v. Salerno
In Salerno,9 the United States Supreme Court affirmed, by a six
to three majority, that focus on the accused's propensity for "dan-
gerousness" in the bail decision is facially constitutional. Such a
holding meanders through the root and soil system of the liberty
tree. Inevitably, the result has been a spirited dialogue among
commentators and the judiciary.
34. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. at 1447.
35. Id. at 1444.
36. Id. at 1450.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1455.
39. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 740 (1987). The Court held the
compelling regulatory purpose of the Act was not facially unconstitutional, and
that the real function of the Act was to solve pressing societal problems of crime
committed by persons on release. Id. Hence, this law constituted permissible
regulation, as opposed to, impermissible punishment. Id. at 73940. This decision
came on the heels of an earlier case affirming the dangerousness doctrine, shortly
after enactment of the 1984 Act. Accord United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp.
1442, 1449-50 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (stating that a presumption of innocence is a doc-
trine that affects the trial process, but it has no application to a determination of
the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even be-
gun).
40. E.g., Karen A. Rooney, Note, Detainingfor Danger Under the Federal and Mas-
sachusetts Bail Statutes: Controversial But Constitutional, 22 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
Civ. CONFINEMENT 465, 480 (1996) (stating that "the integrity of the criminal jus-
tice system is unquestionably at stake when that system releases into the commu-
nity a clearly dangerous individual"); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial
Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REv. 335, 424-26 (1990) (stating that preven-
tive detention provisions may have a place, but the current trend is extremely
1278 [Vol. 27:2
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The defendants in the Salerno case, alleged Mafia chieftains,
were charged with various racketeering activities. 4' The district
court ordered the accused detained, without bail, citing their dan-. 42
ger to the community. The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed, finding a ground of future dangerousness violates
substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment.
43
The Supreme Court held that provisions of the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 constitute "permissible regulation rather than imper-
missible punishment," and further, a regulatory interest in public
safety may "outweigh an individual's liberty interest." In essence,
the logic is if legislative intent was not punitive, and a pressing so-
cietal need is satisfied, then the detention is regulatory in nature.
In a stinging dissent, Justice Marshall criticized "the ease with
which the conclusion is reached suggests the worthlessness of the
achievement." 46 Indeed, he attacks the majority's technique of rest-
ing the foundational logic for infringing a basic right upon "obfus-
cation;" that is, just "redefine any measure which is claimed to be
punishment as regulation and, magically, the Constitution no
longer prohibits its imposition. The states, when not abridging a
federal constitutional right, were free to digress.48
C. Minnesota Bail Law
Modern Minnesota bail law is based upon the federal Bail Re-
form Act of 1966,49 and embodied in Minnesota procedural law.5°
dangerous and threatening to fundamental liberties); MaureenJ. Mann, Overlook-
ing the Constitution: The Problem With Connecticut's Bail Reforms, 24 CONN. L. REv. 915,
962-63 (1992) (indicating that of the states whose constitutions create a right to
bail, "only three have enacted laws permitting pretrial detention based on consid-
erations of dangerousness"); Louis M. Natali,Jr. & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Redrafting
the Due Process Model: The Preventive Detention Blueprint, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1225, 1236
(1989) (stating it was unsurprising for ChiefJustice Rehnquist to fail to mention a
presumption of innocence [in Salerno] since, some years earlier in Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979), he reached the conclusion that a presumption of innocence
should be limited to the forum of the trial).
41. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 743.
42. Id. at 743-44.
43. Id. at 744.
44. Id. at 740.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 759 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 760.
48. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
49. Carbone, supra note 9, at 523-27.
50. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02. The rule fixes a preference for pretrial release
2000] 1279
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A number of specific bail provisions are provided by statute,
including admission to bail for all non-capital offenses,5' maximum
52 13bail amounts for common crimes, use of bail money, electronic
monitoring while on release,54 and surety or recognizance bonds. 5
In only a single case, State v. Pett,56 has the Minnesota Supreme
Court interpreted the "bail clause" of the constitution.5 ' The sig-
nificance of Pett is that all crimes are now bailable at common lawS 58
in Minnesota.
Further, the question of cash only bail reached the Minnesota
Supreme Court on but a single occasion before Brooks.59 In that in-
stance, the court failed to decide the goint, holding the mootness
doctrine precluded arrival at the issue.
III. THE BROOKS DECISION
A. The Facts
Brooks, a Minnesota citizen, 6' was serving a one-year sentence
with no monetary conditions attached. Id. However, in the interest of public
safety, a judge may place the person in the care of a designated person; place re-
strictions on the travel, associations or places of abode of the accused; require the
execution of an appearance bond; or impose any other condition deemed rea-
sonably necessary to assure appearance. Id.
51. MINN. STAT. § 629.16 (1998).
52. Id. § 629.471 (1998).
53. Id. § 629.53.
54. Id. § 629.531.
55. Id. § 629.67.
56. 253 Minn. 429, 92 N.W.2d 205 (1958).
57. 92 N.W.2d at 206. In Pett, the court confronted the issue of whether bail
could be denied after abolition of the death penalty. Id. The state argued the
abolition action was directed at an offense, not a punishment; however, the court
held a trial court has no discretion except to fix the amount of the bail. Id. at 209.
58. State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 352 (Minn. 2000).
59. State v. Arens, 586 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1998). Interestingly, Arens argued
an exception to the mootness doctrine because the issue of cash only bail was ca-
pable of repetition, yet evaded review; was functionally justiciable; and was of
statewide significance. Id. at 133. Arens was defeated on appeal. Id. Yet, on iden-
tical grounds, and less than one year later, the court reversed course, claiming a
mootness exception in the Brooks case. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 348.
60. Arens, 586 N.W.2d at 133.
61. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 346. Brooks is a member of the Mdewakanton
Sioux tribe, and thus eligible for a substantial income from casino gaming profits.
The appeals court took note of this fact. Id. In addition, this was Brooks eleventh
conviction for driving after license revocation. Id. Also, he is a convicted felon.
Respondent's Informal Brief and Appendix at 11, State v. Brooks, No. C1-98-2388,
1999 WL 153793 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1999).
1280 [Vol. 27:2
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62
through electronic home monitoring. Terms of the sentence
called for Brooks to undergo periodic controlled substance test-
ing.6' The results of a first test were positive for cocaine, so Brooks
underwent a second test.64 The results of the second test were also
positive, hence Brooks was found to be in violation of the condi-
65
tions for his 'at home' sentence.
Local law enforcement attempted to take Brooks into custody,
however Brooks fled upon police arrival. 66 Subsequently, Brooks
67 68
was charged with escape from custody, apprehended in Florida
and returned to Minnesota.69
At the bail hearing the state requested "cash bail" at the statu-
tory maximum for a gross misdemeanor, citing Brooks' predisposi-
tion for flight.70 At the next hearing, Brooks moved for bail reduc-
tion or allowance for bond.7' The court denied the motion, and
72
imposed cash bail for the maximum amount. Later, a second
judge at the pretrial omnibus hearing denied a similar motion.73
Brooks appealed the district court ruling arguing that "cashS . 74
only" bail is unconstitutional. The court of appeals held "cash
only" bail does not violate the Minnesota Constitution, because the
term "sufficient sureties" does not create a constitutional right to
post bond.
7 5
B. The Court's Holding
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower court, hold-
ing that cash only bail is unconstitutional.76
It reached this conclusion following a review of cash only bail
62. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 346.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 347.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. In addition, the court of appeals reasoned that "[t ] he form of the se-
curity, as much as its sufficiency, is for the protection of the court and is not a mat-
ter of the constitutional right of the defendant." State v. Brooks, No. CI-98-2388,
1999 WL 153793, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1999).
76. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 354.
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in other states with identical or similar constitutions," an examina-
tion of the term "sufficient sureties" as set forth in the bail clause of
the Minnesota Constitution, and a reasoning vis-i-vis how these
forms of surety would apply in the Brooks circumstance.7 s
The court believed "[s]urety can encompass a broad array of
undertakings, often by a third person, that provide adequate assur-
ance for the performance of an obligation." 9 In addition, the
court concluded that any of these surety forms of guarantee could
satisfy a monetary bail amount necessary to ensure the accused's
appearance.
Further, the court reasoned exercise of unlimited discretion by
a judge would result-over time-in a requirement for unacceptable
forms of guarantee.8 ' The problem with cash only bail, according
to the court, is a limitation imposed by the judiciary on the form of
82acceptable bail.
Ruling carefully, the court explicitly avoided the issue of re-
lease conditions, as might be encountered in the preventive deten-
tion inferno surrounding Salerno, and strictly limited their holding
83to the constitutionality of cash only bail.
Justice Stringer, through a dissenting opinion, expressed a
concern that the court was limiting judicial discretion., Justice
Stringer makes two points. First, the majority is incorrect when
claiming the purpose of the Bail Clause is to protect the defen-
77. Id. at 352. The court mentioned three foreign jurisdictions: Ohio, Lou-
isiana, and Tennessee. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court held cash only bail was un-
constitutional relying on both the plain meaning of its state constitution and
procedural law. Id.; State ex rel. Jones v. Hendon, 609 N.E.2d 541, 543-44 (Ohio
1993). Louisiana reached the same point via the plain meaning of the word
"surety" as applied in statute. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 352; see also State v. Golden,
546 So. 2d 501, 503 (La. Ct. App. 1989), writ denied, 547 So. 2d 365 (La. 1989).
While the Tennessee Court of Appeals discussed the constitutionality of cash only
bail in dicta, that court interpreted the statute as not allowing cash only bail.
Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 352; Lewis Bail Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Ct., 1997 WL
711137, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1997) (No. C-97-62).
78. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 352-53.
79. Id. at 353.
80. Id.
81. Id. The example employed by the court was a situation where ajudge lev-
ied bail consisting of real property, and the accused had no real property. Id. The
result is a constitutional deprivation of rights. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 354 (emphasizing that "this case addresses only the issue of constitu-
tionality of cash only bail and does not involve release conditions").
84. Id. at 355 (Stringer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "district court could
not be reasonably assured of [Brooks] next appearance in court").
1282 [Vol. 27:2
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85dant. Instead, both state and federal precedent define bail's pur-
pose as ensuring accused appearance and submission to the court's
judgment.86 Second, the majority construction of "sufficient sure-
ties" to mean access to third parties is not appropriate."'
IV. ANALYSIS
In Brooks, the court is concerned with the potential for judicial
8abuse relating to pretrial custody arrangements. Unspoken in the
decision, but rippling like an undercurrent throughout it's fabric,
are the twin canons of equal protection and substantive due proc-
ess.89 Indeed, the ability of a state to exert a subtle, yet compelling,
influence over due process cash bail questions is also a subject of
scrutiny in other jurisdictions. 9
The impetus behind the Bail Reform Act of 1966, and Minne-
sota's subsequent statutory modifications, was a liberty interest for
the disadvantaged. 9' Cash only bail is not a principal means of pre-
trial release, 9' but its improper use constitutes denial of equal pro-
tection under the law. Such was the case in Brooks, where the ac-
cused was deprived of a fundamental right to freedom before
conviction.94 The court reinforced this aspect when noting "cash
only bail orders can be used to deny bail to accuseds who have
other means of providing sufficient surety.
95
By way of illustration, as recently as 1992, clear and convincing
85. Id. at 354 (Stringer,J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 355 (StringerJ, dissenting).
88. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 351-353.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
90. See generally State v. Proto, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 249 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000);
Dorsey v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 154,174 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
91. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
92. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.51, Type of Pretrial
Release or Detention of Felony Defendants in the 75 Largest Counties (1996),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t551.pdf. In a recent assessment
of felony arrests, 34% of the defendants obtained non-financial pretrial release,
29% received a financial release, and 37% detained until trial. Id. Only 2% of fel-
ony arrests resulted in the imposition of cash only bail. Id.
93. State v. Raddatz, No. CX-98-2292, 1999 WL 243637 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
27, 1999). Here, defendant failed to argue the issue of constitutionality of cash
only bail, instead, relying on an argument of "unreasonability"-which the court
found unconvincing. Id.
94. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
95. State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 353 (Minn. 2000).
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evidence existed supporting a conclusion that racial discrimination
may be a factor in the bail decision for Minnesota's most populous
county. 96 The Brooks court, aware of a need for vigilance concern-
ing equal protection, was like a carpenter with a small nail trying to
fix a noisy doorframe. That is, the court was seeking to buttress in-
dividual liberty interests against the backdrop of daily court ad-
ministration. In doing so, the court merely made it more difficult
for a judge to deprive a citizen of his liberty by "restricting his right
to post bail by providing alternative forms of sufficient surety. 97
A variety of forms of guarantee are available in Minnesota,
among them: surety bonds, deposit bonds, property bonds, and
cash. 98 Bail schedules, outlining bail amounts for each type of of-
fense, were once common in American courtrooms, although em-
phasis on pretrial release has limited their widespread use in recent99
years. In Minnesota, after Brooks, a judge sets an amount for
monetary bail, while the defendant chooses the form of guarantee
most appropriate for his or her circumstance. Otherwise, pre-
conviction freedom would be unfairly determined by a defendant's
ability to pay, and any ensuing mandated detention is not blind be-
fore the law. 00
Since the court was dealing only with interpretation of con-
straints contained in the Bail Clause, and because the Bail Clause is
limited to pre-conviction relief, it is unclear whether its holding
also applies to post-conviction release on appeal.
In addition, the court expressly excluded a cash deposit for
96. Sharon Krmpotich, Symposium on Racial Bias in the Judicial System, Appendix
D - Data Analysis Reports, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 832, 838 (1993). In a 1993 study of
misdemeanor arrests in Hennepin county, it was established that release without
bail, for those defendants without a prior arrest record, occurred in the following
proportions: White (Assault) 20% Minority (Assault) 8%; White (Prostitution)
24% Minority (Prostitution) 16%; White (Theft) 63% Minority (Theft) 40%.
Among those with prior records, a similar theme prevails: White (Assault) 13%
Minority (Assault) 5%; White (Prostitution) 25% Minority (Prostitution) 16%;
White (Theft) 46% Minority (Theft) 32%. Clearly, race is a factor in the bail deci-
sion. Id. But see Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in
Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REv. 987, 990 (1994) (stating that a core finding of a bail
bond study was that bond dealers in New Haven charged significantly lower rates
to minority defendants than to whites).
97. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 354.
98. Lay & De La Hunt, supra note 29, at 935-41.
99. E.g., Roy B. FLEMMING, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL, 28-29, 103-06, (Mal-
colm M. Feeley ed., 1982).
100. See generally PETER R. JONES & JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, CRIMINAL COURTS FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY, 144-165 (Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart J. D'Alessio eds., 1st ed.
1999).
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less than the full amount of bail from its definition of cash only
bail.10 ' This is similar to the ten-percent deposit provisions found
in some jurisdictions. 102 A motivating factor for this exclusion may
be concern for disadvantage suffered by poor defendants, and the
exclusion is consistent with a liberal view of the rights of an ac-
cused.
03
V. CONCLUSION
An accused's right to a presumption of innocence, to rouse a
defense, and to conduct his or her affairs unfettered before trial
are fundamental to a free society. In the federal system, these
rights have been undergoing a significant transformation over the
104past twenty years.
In Brooks,10 5 the Minnesota Supreme Court merely casts a
shroud of safety over any citizen accused of crime-some rightly,
some wrongly-by making a judge choose the amount of monetary
bail. 106 An accused may satisfy this bail through a range of surety
101. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 346 n.1.
102. See generally Robert A. Kaye, Oregon's Ten Percent Deposit Bail System-
Rethinking the Professional Surety's Role, 66 OR. L. REv. 661, 683-84 (1987). As a
method of mitigating the issue attendant with professional bail bondsmen, some
jurisdictions have allowed a defendant to post a cash amount, usually ten percent
of the bail amount, with the court. Id. at 661, 672. In theory, this eliminates the
need for a bondsman and works to aid an accused that may already be economi-
cally deprived. Id. at 661, 673. Oregon, however, has identified a number of prob-
lems surrounding this approach after nearly twenty years in operation. Id. at 673-
74. Among the problems identified: higher failure to appear rates for those pay-
ing a deposit; inability to raise the deposit amount; and lack of an administrative
method for collecting remaining security from those defendants failing to appear.
Id. These issues have caused at least some commentators to call for a reexamina-
tion of the use of low cash deposit surety within the State of Oregon. Id. at 674.
103. Supra, articles cited note 40. More recently, courts have shown a predis-
position toward use of the security bond, as opposed to the surety bond. The se-
curity bond normally calls for a ten percent cash deposit by a defendant with the
court, while the surety bond calls for this deposit with a commercial bail bonds-
man. Kaye, supra note 102, at 663. Security bonds control a defendant through
threat of additional criminal penalties, loss of deposit, and potential loss of more
money if a court sues for the remainder. On a surety bond, all control is vested
with the bondsman. Id.
104. E.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (stating preventa-
tive detention does not constitute impermissible punishment before trial); Schall
v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984) (stating "there is nothing inherently unattain-
able about a prediction of future criminal conduct"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
533 (1979) (stating a presumption of innocence applies only in a trial context and
has no application to pretrial detainment).
105. 604 N.W.2d 345.
106. Id. at 354.
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options.
The Brooks decision is narrowly constructed. Whether by de-
sign or neglect, the court failed to take this opportunity to clarify
the concept of punishment and bail as applied to specific due
process standards. Particularly important is a need for consistency of
application surrounding fundamental rights afforded an accused,
between a defendant's initial contact with a criminal justice author-
ity and any subsequent trial. Altogether too often, the current fed-
eral model is overly accepting of contraction and expansion of a
given right at different points along the criminal justice highway.
Citizens of Minnesota would benefit by shining a judicial light on
this often-neglected area.
In addition, the court found the purpose of the Bail Clause is
to limit "government power to detain an accused prior to trial '
thus broadening fundamental rights granted to citizens under the
Minnesota Constitution. The court afforded no guidance on the
applicability of cash only bail for post-conviction release. It is likely
where a final judgment has been rendered courts will defer to legis-
lative intent and direction during the appellate review process for
the convicted criminal.
Cash only bail is no longer an option for the criminal courts
while the accused awaits trial in Minnesota. The liberty interest of
a criminal detainee, while not unfettered, remains strongly tied to
state constitutional safeguards. In Minnesota, it's the law.
107. Id. at 353.
108. Id. at 350.
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